The Epistemology of Experimental Systems in Biological Research

Dissertation, University of Minnesota (1999)
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Abstract

Philosophers typically presume knowledge is a form of belief , and philosophers of science have usually followed, conceiving scientific knowledge as a set of theoretical or explanatory products. I argue this traditional approach to knowledge is inadequate for understanding our knowledge in experimental biology. In contrast to the traditional approach, I develop an account of scientific knowledge as a practice. This differs from traditional accounts in two significant respects. First, biological knowledge is not a set of products, but an ongoing process. Second, the practice is not just a set of theories, but a multidimensional entity that also includes our experimental practices, patterns of reasoning, and techniques to apply theoretical products in predicting and explaining phenomena. ;My specific account of practice is unique in that it develops the "experimental turn" in philosophy of science. Most philosophers developing accounts of knowledge as a practice or research tradition still center their accounts around the theoretical component of practice. In contrast, my account of knowledge as practice emphasizes our experimental practices as a central component of the practice constituting our knowledge. ;I develop my account of practice in the specific context of experimental biology, coupling general philosophical arguments with issues more specific to experimental biology . ;I ground my account of knowledge as practice with a detailed example of biological research with the "cell-free" system and its use to break the genetic code. I argue the genetic code is not a definitive product, but is better understood as an incomplete component of an investigative practice. In addition, I set my account of knowledge in the context of John Dewey's pragmatist epistemology. For Dewey did not think of knowledge as a form of justified true belief---which he dubbed the Spectator Theory of Knowledge---but as an ongoing inquiry in which we learn how to apply our concepts, patterns of reasoning, and sensory mechanisms to predict and control the world.

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