An Empirical Investigation of Purported Passage Phenomenology

Journal of Philosophy 117 (7):353-386 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse correlation: people were more likely to report having passage phenomenology if they endorsed a non-dynamical theory of time. Given that people do not have an unambiguous phenomenology as of time passing, we conclude that this is suggestive evidence in favor of veridical non-dynamism—the view that our phenomenology is veridical, and that it does not unambiguously represent that time passes. Instead, our phenomenology veridically has some quite different content.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Time Passages.Miller Kristie - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):149-176.
The Experience of Temporal Passage.Akiko Monika Frischhut - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Glasgow
Do we (seem to) perceive passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
Experiencing Time By Simon Prosser.Barry Lee - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):861-865.
The cresting wave: a new moving spotlight theory.Kristie Miller - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):94-122.
Do the Folk Represent Time as Essentially Dynamical?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-26

Downloads
648 (#26,767)

6 months
160 (#20,817)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Andrew James Latham
Aarhus University
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
James Norton
University of Tasmania

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references