Abstract

It frequently happens in philosophy that a philosopher, in trying to resolve a long-standing dispute between two opposing schools of thought, comes up with a schema that not only resolves the targeted dispute, but in addition necessarily imposes a residual set of regulations and norms, to which it had to subscribe in its attempt to solve the dispute, given its own presuppositions and points of departure. This residual set of norms is then viewed by the subsequent generation of thinkers, who start off their philosophy from a slightly different set of presuppositions, as being superfluous to what they conceive as the real project of the previous thinker. Hence, these subsequent philosophers build their philosophy by fundamentally modifying the stance of the previous thinker, all the while acknowledging the resolution of the dispute the latter carried out in his philosophy. One can view this process of fundamental shifts in orientation as the process of transition from one revolution to another in the history of philosophy.