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Coherentists' Distractions
Philosophical Topics 23 (1):257-274 (1995)
Abstract
The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1751-1769.
A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”.William A. Roche - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.
Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
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