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Variation and the accuracy of predictions
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):181-193 (1997)
Abstract
I present a justification for the intution that more-varied data are more valuable than the same number of less-varied data by showing that the more-varied data help to improve the accuracy of our predictions.My notes
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Citations of this work
Understanding scientific study via process modeling.Robert W. P. Luk - 2010 - Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78.
A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success.Malcolm R. Forster - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
Predictive accuracy as an achievable goal of science.Malcolm R. Forster - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S124-S134.
Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science.Malcolm R. Forster - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S124-S134.
References found in this work
Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
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