On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief

Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188 (2019)

Abstract

Thomas Kroedel has recently proposed an interesting Pareto-style condition on permissible belief. Despite the condition’s initial plausibility, this paper aims at providing a counterexample to it. The example is based on the view that a proper condition on permissible belief should not give permission to believe a proposition that undermines one’s belief system or whose epistemic standing decreases in the light of one’s de facto beliefs.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.

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