Sceptical Rationality

Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is widely assumed that it is rational to suspend one’s belief regarding a certain proposition only if one’s evidence is neutral regarding that proposition. In this paper I broaden this condition, and defend, on the basis of an improved ancient argument, that it is rational to suspend one’s belief even if the available evidence is not neutral – or even close to neutral.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.Mark Okrent - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):381 – 404.
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.
Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Timothy O'Connor & Laura Frances Callahan (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.
The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.
Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
Resisting Explanation.G. Randolph Mayes - 2000 - Argumentation 14 (4):361-380.
De pyrronistische zaak.Jan Willem Wieland - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (3):523-532.
Is `god exists' a `hinge proposition' of religious belief?Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):129-140.
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-16

Downloads
187 (#101,144)

6 months
6 (#403,662)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.
Sextus and the Nature of Suspension.Robb Dunphy - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2241-2259.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The philosophical writings of Descartes.René Descartes - 1984 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism.Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes (eds.) - 1994 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references