Abstract

This chapter begins by briefly considering Foucault's genealogies of the modern moral subject as the backdrop against which he conducted his inquiries on the ethical forms of subjectivation found in antiquity. It then turns at greater length to these inquiries, bringing them into focus in terms of possibilities for the self‐transformation of the subject today. To make sense of these possibilities, and defend them against familiar criticisms, the chapter introduces and defends a meta‐ethical distinction between “orientations” and “commitments” in ethics. A long section of this chapter is devoted to showing how self‐transformation makes sense of a range of topics featured in Foucault's late ethical writings. The author focuses primarily on the care of the self (including aesthetics of existence and pleasure) and the philosophical way of life (including ancient parrhesia and modern critique). The chapter concludes by opening a window onto further possibilities raised by the foregoing discussion.