Defending technology: a normative defence of technologically assisted officiating in binary referee situations

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy:1-13 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article discusses how technological official aids influence sporting competitions in terms of fairness and flow. It addresses the main arguments against technological official aids used to assist refereeing in binary referee situations. First, I argue that the criticism directed at the use of ball tracking devices (‘reconstructed track devices’) is mainly unjustified and that these devices provide the opportunity to make refereeing in certain types of sport fairer. In this regard, I also argue that empirical findings about referees’ decision-making and potential biases must be considered when deciding how technological official aids influence the fairness of sporting competitions. Then I attempt to refute the argument that no situations are more decisive than others in sports with no fixed breaks, such as football. Finally, I scrutinise the argument that human fallibility in refereeing is somehow valuable in itself. Consequently, this article concludes that there are no convincing arguments against the use of technological official aids in binary referee situations.

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