What is the 'philosophy of sport'? What does one do to count as a practitioner in the philosophy of sport? What conception of philosophy underpins the answer to those questions? In this important new book, leading sport philosopher Graham McFee draws on a lifetime's philosophical inquiry to reconceptualise the field of study. The book covers important topics such as Olympism, the symbolisation of argument, and epistemology and aesthetics in sport research; and concludes with a section of 'applied' sport philosophy by (...) looking at rules and officiating. Using a Wittgensteinian framework, and employing a rich array of sporting examples throughout, McFee challenges the assumptions of traditional analytic philosophy regarding the completeness required of concepts and the exceptionlessness required of philosophical claims, providing the reader with a new set of tools with which to approach this challenging subject. On Sport and the Philosophy of Sport is fascinating and important reading for any serious students or researchers of sport philosophy. (shrink)

Sport, Rules and Values presents a philosophical perspective on some issues concerning the character of sport. Central questions for the text are motivated from real life sporting examples as described in newspaper reports. For instance, the (supposed) subjectivity of umpiring decisions is explored via an examination of the judging ice-skating at the Salt Lake City Olympic Games of 2002. Throughout, the presentation is rich in concrete cases from sporting situations, including baseball, football, and soccer. While granting the constitutive nature of (...) the rules of sport, discussion focuses on three broad uses commonly urged for rules: in defining sport; in judging or assessing sport (as deployed by judges or umpires); and in characterizing the value of sport, especially if that value is regarded as moral value. In general, McFee rejects a conception of the determinacy of rules as possible within sport, and a parallel picture of the determinacy assumed to be required by philosophy. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a (...) scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy, McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation. (shrink)

The study of sport is characterised by its inter-disciplinarity, with researchers drawing on apparently incompatible research traditions and ethical benchmarks in the natural sciences and the social sciences, depending on their area of specialisation. In this groundbreaking study, Graham McFee argues that sound high-level research into sport requires a sound rationale for one’s methodological choices, and that such a rationale requires an understanding of the connection between the practicalities of researching sport and the philosophical assumptions which underpin them. By examining (...) touchstone principles in research methodology, such as the contested ‘gold standard’ of voluntary informed consent in the natural sciences and the postmodern denial of ‘truth’ in the social sciences, McFee demonstrates that epistemology and ethics are inextricably linked. Drawing on a wide range of examples, from the laboratory to the sports field, McFee explores the concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ in sports research and makes a powerful case for a philosophical deepening of our approach to method and methodology in sport. This book is important reading for all advanced students and researchers working in sport, exercise and related disciplines. (shrink)

The paper addresses the intuitions of aestheticians concerning a fundamental contrast between the judgement, appreciation, and interest appropriate to artworks and those judgements, appreciations, and interests appropriate to all the other (non-art) cases of aesthetic interest. Then terms such as beauty must amount to something different in art-cases from that in other (aesthetic) cases. For the fact of being an artwork is transfigurational, allowing artistic properties to be (truly) ascribed. In arguing against the univocality of terms such as beauty (by (...) stressing occasion-sensitivity), the paper rejects the idea of a ‘look of the thing’ shared by art and non-art. And the pervasiveness of this artistic/aesthetic contrast is urged. (shrink)

Although football is often referred to as ‘the beautiful game’, to take that idea very seriously — by aestheticizing the target of spectating — is to misunderstand a purposive sport such as football. Yet such a view seems required by Stephen Mumford’s endorsement of the purist spectator, in contrast to the partisan, as attending to ‘… only aesthetic aspects of sport’. But, first, not all non-purposive appreciation is thereby aesthetic appreciation, as Mumford assumes. And, second, while a technical understanding of (...) the aesthetic includes both positive and negative aesthetic concerns, an everyday version addresses only positive aesthetic value. Now, there are concepts of grace, line and so on, applicable to football: that is, concepts suitable to aesthetic appreciation. And sometimes, for instance, in TV’s ‘Goal of the Month’ competition, such appreciation sets aside the purposive dimension of such sports. Yet that dimension is fund.. (shrink)

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, 'Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?' objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values ; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of (...) normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism - these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term 'intrinsic' is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones. (shrink)

(2004). Normativity, Justification,and (MacIntyrean) Practices: Some Thoughts on Methodologyfor the Philosophy of Sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 15-33.

In 1974, David Best rightly contrasted purposive sports (exemplified by most sports) with aesthetic sports; and recently I was careful to exempt the issues for aesthetic sports from my critique of the prospects for an all-embracing philosophy of officiating. While discretion plays a part in umpiring or refereeing in both kinds of sports, it is especially important for aesthetic sports (such as gymnastic vaulting, ice-skating or diving), where the manner of execution determines victory. Here, it is urged that the issue (...) of objectivity for judgements in aesthetic sports is not the most crucial aspect: we have reason to expect correct accounts from knowledgeable, sensitive and experienced judges or umpires. Impartiality remains a concern, of course, not least between the training for judges or umpires might tend to favour particular styles of performing key movements. So that many past rule-changes are explained as attempts to improve fairness, with competitors getting their ‘just deserts’. In doing so, they have implicitly contributed to what is then valued in the manner of execution in aesthetic sports. The term ‘aesthetic’ is generally applied in its positive valence, although one must recognize the negative valence also. But, for aesthetic sports, the rules provide guidance as to what will or will not be regarded positively in the context of competition. And rule-changes here will sometimes be best explained as attempting to modify what is rewarded in such sports, the manner of performance. Such changes might be expected to bear on the character of the sport (here exemplified through men’s ice-skating). (shrink)

For some aestheticians, Wittgenstein's notion of _seeing as (or aspect perception) could be used to explain perception of artworks as artworks (artistic appreciation). This paper urges that the idea of aspect perception cannot provide such a model, even for a perceptualist about artistic appreciation (like the author). First, this would be inconsistent with Wittgenstein's argumentative strategy in key passages in _Philosophical Investigations Part Two. Second, the characteristics of aspect perception make it unsuitable as a model, whatever Wittgenstein's intentions. Moreover (one (...) of Wittgenstein's own contentions), a suitably rich account of perception does not require this appeal to aspects. (shrink)

The question whether human choices and actions are causally determined or are in a way free, and the implications of this for our moral, personal and social lives continues to challenge philosophers. This book explores the determinist rejection of free will through a detailed exposition of the central determinist argument and a consideration of the responses to each of its premises. At every stage familiar examples and case studies help frame and ground the argument. The discussion is at no time (...) peremptory and the invitation to the reader to be drawn in and to contribute to the debate as an engaged participant is palpable in the manner and approach adopted throughout. "Free Will" will be welcomed by students looking for an engaging and clear introduction to the subject, and as a rigorous exercise in philosophical argument it will serve, for the beginning student new to philosophy, as an excellent springboard into the subject more generally. (shrink)

The paper highlights the centrality of some concepts from philosophy of sport for philosophical aesthetics. Once Best conclusively answered negatively the fundamental question, ‘Can any sport-form be an artform?’, what further issues remained at the intersection of these parts of philosophy? Recent work revitalizing this interface, especially Mumford’s Watching Sport, contested Best’s fundamental distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports, and insisted that purist viewers are taking an aesthetic interest in sporting events. Here, we defend Best’s conception against considerations Mumford hoped (...) would bring the aesthetics of art and sport closer together, thereby elaborating the aesthetics of sport. But, against Mumford’s resolutely psychological conception of an aim, we follow Best to defend the centrality, for purposive sports, of the means/ends contrast even when taking an aesthetic interest in such sports. We conclude with general speculations about the potential future of the discussions originated here. (shrink)

A review of Gary Kemp´s and Gabriele M. Mras´s Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-As and Seeing-In.

The question whether human choices and actions are causally determined or are in a way free, and the implications of this for our moral, personal and social lives continues to challenge philosophers. This book explores the determinist rejection of free will through a detailed exposition of the central determinist argument and a consideration of the responses to each of its premises. At every stage familiar examples and case studies help frame and ground the argument. The discussion is at no time (...) peremptory and the invitation to the reader to be drawn in and to contribute to the debate as an engaged participant is palpable in the manner and approach adopted throughout. "Free Will" will be welcomed by students looking for an engaging and clear introduction to the subject, and as a rigorous exercise in philosophical argument it will serve, for the beginning student new to philosophy, as an excellent springboard into the subject more generally. (shrink)

Why should the philosophical achievement of Ludwig Wittgenstein be taken seriously in the twenty-first century? This text answers this question by elaborating the distinctive therapeutic conception of philosophy defended in Wittgenstein's later work, typified by Philosophical Investigations. Here, Wittgenstein's highly contextual, problem-specific and person-specific conception of the philosophical project is clarified with reference to his own writings. In so doing, this text challenges contemporary failures to properly acknowledge all publications from those writings as posthumous, Nachlass (Legacy), or to treat judiciously (...) the material published from that Legacy. Explicitly following Gordon Baker's last essays (Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects, 2004), and drawing on biographical sources as well as scholarly ones, the text addresses Wittgenstein's published oeuvre. Importantly, this exposition gives weight to the Big Typescript (2005) and Voices of Wittgenstein (2003), as two "projected works" attempting to present Wittgenstein's philosophical agenda. Further, Wittgenstein's very last writings are argued here to constitute a single, broadly unified project, rebutting the suggestion of a 'third Wittgenstein'. Moreover, the book sketches philosophical discussions conducted in line with Wittgenstein's own conception of philosophy's project to continue chains of examples of the kind he used in exposition of it. (shrink)

Collingwood’s work has proved a rich source of ideas for aestheticians, and also fruitful in respect of metaphysical ideas; most especially, suggestive in ways in which a non-realist theory of meaning and understanding might be developed within contemporary directions in the philosophy of language. But these two areas of interest are traditionally seen as importantly different, as depending on different aspects of Collingwood’s works. This paper argues that a potentially fruitful line of development for aesthetics comes from importing into our (...) considerations of art and aesthetic experience Collingwood’s developed views on the nature of metaphysics. (shrink)

Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Volume 44, Issue 1, Page 92-116, December 2019.