The Four Different Aspects of Man-World Relations and the Ontological Nature of Culture

Philosophy Study 6 (5) (2016)
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Abstract

In traditional philosophy, man is usually treated as a subject of knowledge, not as a subject of activity. This naturally led to an ignorance of his creative side and had its echoes in the models of the world put forward. Thus, when the world was mentioned the world meant was that perceived by man and the world man created or planned to create himself was given either a secondary treatment or else it was completely forgotten. But, as man is carrier of active spirit, the things he creates have their place in this world along those created by God. It is without doubt that things created by man are not produced against God’s will. Still, human creativity is the corruption of the original creation, of the harmony of the world, of the book of nature. Man brings order, so to speak, to the world. He achieves this however at the cost of corrupting the Great Order within some narrow limits. Man himself is among the many highly interesting books written before and there exist as many variations of this book as there are human beings. What is the most difficult for man is though, to read his own book, to understand himself. In this article, the concept of the culture as a human creation is analyzed in the light of Man-World and Man-Nature-God relations. In this case, the author firstly explains the four different world models and then determines the boundaries of science and culture, as well as the individual and social strata of culture.

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