Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence

Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (3):293-322 (2010)
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Abstract

At the end of a chapter in his book Race, Racism and Reparations, Angelo Corlett notes that “[t]here remain other queries about racism [than those he addressed in his chapter], which need philosophical exploration. … Perhaps most important, how might racism be unlearned?” (2003, 93). We agree with Corlett’s assessment of its importance, but find that philosophers have not been very keen to directly engage with the issue of how to best deal with, and ultimately do away with, racism. Rather, they have tended to make cursory remarks about the issue at the end of papers devoted to defining “racism” or attempting to capture the essence of racism itself. In this article, we put the issue of how to best deal with racism front and center. We need not start from scratch, however. Despite not being central to many philosophical discussions about race, a number of different strategies for dealing with racism have been suggested. To that end, we have identified three of the most concrete proposals made by philosophers and social theorists, each of which seeks to mitigate racism by inducing psychological changes in individuals.2 For each, we formulate the..

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Author Profiles

Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
Luc Faucher
Université du Québec à Montreal
Daniel Kelly
Purdue University

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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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