Theodore de Laguna's discovery of the deflationary theory of truth

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1025-1033 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Theodore de Laguna develops and argues for a deflationary view of truth well before the publication of what many have taken to be its source, or at least its inspiration, namely Frank P. Ramsey’s paper ‘Facts and Propositions’. I outline de Laguna’s view of truth and the arguments he offers for it; I also discuss its role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. My outline and discussion serve as an introduction to de Laguna’s ‘A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth’, a paper he originally wrote in English but which has hitherto only been published in French.

Similar books and articles

A nominalistic interpretation of truth.Theodore de Laguna & Joel Katzav - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1034-1040.
Realism, Deflationism, and Success.Jerry Kapus - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:75-81.
Truth, Deflationism, and Success.Jerry Kapus - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
Truth, Deflationism, and Success.Jerry Kapus - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Parasitic Liar and the Gappy Solution.Richard Wei Tzu Hou - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:63-69.
For a Deflationary Conception of Truth.Anna Vitola - 1998 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.
Truth, correspondence and deflationism.James O. Young - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-08

Downloads
107 (#49,611)

6 months
265 (#78,378)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joel Katzav
University of Queensland

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein.Cheryl J. Misak - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1948 - Analysis 9 (6):83-97.
VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):215-215.

View all 34 references / Add more references