Realism is often characterized by the claim that sentences are true or false in virtue of their ‘fit’ with reality. However, philosophers motivated by the deflationary view of truth argue that the formulation and defense of realism does not require a substantial conception of truth. The role of truth in stating and defendingrealism can be accounted for in terms of its being a device for expressing generalizations. I sketch the outline of an argument against this position. I begin with the (...) deflationary view of truth and its relevance for realism. I argue that the deflationary view of truth does not show that truth is only being used as a device for expressing generalizations. I then argue that a robust conception of truth is needed to make sense of the objectivity dimension of realism and for the realist explanation of how language contributes to our success in achieving our goals. (shrink)

Intuitively, the concept of truth occupies a substantive role in explaining the contribution of our linguistic utterances to the success of our ordinary actions. However, this claim has been denied recently by advocates of deflationary theories of truth. Although the technical details of the various deflationary theories differ, these theories agree in claiming that the concept of truth does not have a significant role in explaining success and that the utility of the truth predicate consists mainly in its being a (...) device for expressing infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. This paper argues that deflationary accounts of the utility of truth are mistaken. Section 1 outlines a direction for developing the claim that truth plays a substantive role in explaining success. Section 2 argues that deflationary accounts of success are inadequate since they fail to distinguish between the triggering and structuring causes of an event. (shrink)