What’s wrong with the presentist bias? On the threat of intergenerational domination

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (5):725-746 (2023)
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Abstract

What is the wrong behind the widely criticized presentist bias of democracies? In this paper I argue that it is not that future generations are excluded from present-day democratic decision-making quite generally. Rather, I claim that due to the unique risks associated with representing future generations and the limitations on affecting future generations both institutionally and causally, the focus ought to be on including them on a more specific, narrower, set of issues, namely only those that threaten to lead to their domination. I identify such issues as those that may end up being purpose-determining: that may subject future generations to previous generations’ will by forcing them to exert a substantial amount of their energies on dealing with problems caused by their predecessors. I conclude by reflecting on the extent to which political representation together with providing avenues of contestation can minimize the risk of intergenerational domination.

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Anja Karnein
State University of New York at Binghamton

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References found in this work

Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives.Robert E. Goodin - 2007 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (1):40–68.
Republicanism.Philip Pettit - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):640-644.
Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization.Philip Pettit - 1999 - In Sterling Professor of Political Science and Henry R. Luce Director of the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies Ian Shapiro, Ian Shapiro, Casiano Hacker-Cordón & Russell Hardin (eds.), Democracy's Value. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-190.
Liberal Justice, Future People, and Natural Resource Conservation.Joseph Mazor - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):380-408.

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