A bayesian theory of rational acceptance

Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330 (1981)
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0022362X

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10.2307/2026127

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Mark Kaplan
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.

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