Meaning, justification, and truth

Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):109-119 (2005)
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Abstract

In order to compare two forms of radical pragmatism, inferentialism and constructivism, the paper shows how we can represent states of affairs in the world by corresponding symbols in a metaphysically harmless, though seemingly non-inferential way, why not all justifications are inferential transitions, for example those that make heavy use of constructions, and why a prosentential analysis of truth is helpful but not sufficient.

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