Truth, semblance, reconciliation -- The dialectic of modernism and postmodernism -- Art and industrial production -- Ethics and dialogue.

Andrew Arato. Seyla Benhabib. Hauke Brunkhorst. Cornelius Castoriadis. Jean Cohen. Helmut Dubiel. Klaus Eder. Gunter Frankenberg. Hans-Georg Gadamer. Axel Honneth. Johann Baptist Metz. Gertrud Nunner-Winkler. Claus Offe.".

This paper argues that the concept of truth cannot be explained with the help of the idea of justification under ideal conditions. Truth is not a regulative idea. The attempt to replace a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth with one that is conceptually epistemic does not provide an exit from metaphysics. Truth and its justification do not coincide with reference to the ascription of judgements and beliefs. To save the normative power of truth no Archemedean point is needed.

No one has succeeded better than Theodor W. Adorno in analyzing modern culture with all its ambiguities — ambiguities which herald the possibility of an unleashing of aesthetic and communicative potentials as well as the possibility of a withering away of culture. Since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche — with whose aesthetics and epistemology Adorno's thought secretly communicates — no other philosophy of art, at least in Germany, has had such a sustained influence on artists, critics, and intellectuals. The traces of his (...) influence on the consciousness of those who, be it in a productive, critical, or purely receptive capacity, are involved with modern art cannot be overlooked. (shrink)

Together, the two volumes underscore the richness and variety of Habermas's project.Contributors: Karl-Otto Apel. Richard J. Bernstein. Peter Burger. Martin Jay. Thomas McCarthy. Herbert Schnadelbach. Charles Taylor. Michael Theunissen.

This paper argues that Adorno's metaphysics can be rescued from the constellation of his messianic materialism. The recovery of metaphysics in this context also means that it is rescued as the basis of possible critique. Rescue here entails that the ideas of truth, freedom, justice and democracy should be seen as transcending whatever is empirically given, while remaining immanently operative within society. These ideas can still be drawn on for a critique of the present, thus renewing the original project of (...) critical theory. (shrink)

The title, Endgames, finally also refers polemically to postmodernist games with an end of modernity; as opposed to these, Wellmer defends the fragile moral and political substance of the modernity that postmodernists attempt to overcome- ...

En su libro Sobre la revolución Hannah Arendt trató de saldar cuentas tanto con la tradición liberal como con la marxista; esto es, con las dos tradiciones políticas que han dominado los últimos 150 años. Su tesis básica es que ambos, marxistas y liberales demócratas, han malentendido que lo que era verdaderamente revolucionario en las modernas revoluciones era el siempre frustrado intento de una "constitutiolibertatis" - la intención de establecer un espacio político de libertad pública en el cual las personas, (...) como ciudadanos libres e iguales, puedan tomar control de sus asuntos comunes. En este artículo, el autor trata de mostrar cómo la idea arendtiana de democracia directa o "consejo" democrático, idea que tomada literalmente parece ingenua, puede ser usada productivamente si fuera integrada -en vez de opuesta- allegado liberal democrático-socialista. (shrink)

¿Qué quiere decir comprender una manifestación? Una respuesta evidente y plausible a primera vista sería: Quiere decir comprender lo que dice un hablante y cómo piensa lo que dice. El sentido de una manifestación se comprende aquí como el resultado de dos fuerzas: la de la significación de una oración y la de la intención de un hablante que quiere decir (hacer comprender) algo.

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions (...) on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence. (shrink)