Abstract

U radu se analizira Aristotelovo razmatranje životinja, a u središtu autorovog istraživanja su tri pitanja: prisustvo logosa kod životinja, mogu li životinje djelovati voljno i jesu li životinje odgovorne za ono što čine. Aristotelov generalni stav je da životinje nemaju vjerovanja, mnijenja, rasuđivanja, mišljenja, razuma i uma. Proučavanjem Stagiraninovih spisa utvrđeno je, zatim, da životinje mogu djelovati voljno. Odgovor na dilemu jesu li životinje odgovorne za ono što čine ovisi o razumijevanju pojma odgovornosti kod Aristotela. Ako se odgovornost razumije kao reguliranje svih onih aktivnosti koje su učinjene hotimično, tj. voljno, životinje se tada mogu smatrati odgovornima. S druge strane, ako se opseg odgovornosti ograniči na moralnu evaluaciju nečijeg djelanja, u koju je uključena aktivnost logosa, životinje će biti izuzete iz ovako razumljenog pojma odgovornosti. Autor je, na Aristotelovom tragu, zaključio da, budući da životinje mogu imati phantasiu da je ono što rade ispravno ili pogrešno, one za svoje čine trebaju biti nagrađene odnosno kažnjene.This paper analyzes Aristotle’s treatment of animals and the author’s research focuses on three issues: the presence of logos in animals, if animals can act voluntarily and if animals are responsible for what they do. Aristotle’s general standing point is that animals do not have beliefs, opinions, calculations, thoughts, thinking and reason. By studying Stagirites’ volumes it has been determined, subsequently, that animals can act voluntarily. Resolution to the dilemma whether animals are responsible for what they do depends on the understanding of the Aristotle’s concept of responsibility. If responsibility is understood as regulating all of those activities which were undertaken on purpose i.e. voluntarily, animals can be considered responsible. On the other hand, if the scope of responsibility is limited to the moral evaluation of acts, including the activity of logos, animals will be excluded from thus understood concept of responsibility. The author has, following Aristotle’s footsteps, concluded that since animals can have phantasia that what they do is right or wrong, they should be either rewarded or punished for their acts