U radu se analizira Talesovo shvaćanje duše, uz primarno oslanjanje na Aristotelove kapitalne uvide i konzultiranje relevantnih doksografskih bilješki. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da je Stagiranin miletskog fizičara, uzimajući u obzir njegovo navodno stajalište da kamen ima dušu zato što pokreće željezo, situirao u kategoriju mislilaca koji su smatrali da je duša načelo kretanja. Autor je zatim konstatirao da je mišljenje da je duša pomiješana u cjelini povezano s poznatom sintagmom koja se pripisuje Talesu: »sve je puno bogova«. Ako se ove (...) formulacije povežu s izjavama o kamenu magnetu i jantaru, onda se dobiva mogući zaključak da je, po Milećaninu, sve oduševljeno, tj. oživljeno, kako organski tako i neorganski dijelovi kozmosa. Konačno, ako ovi stavovi jesu autentično Talesovi, onda je on »rodonačelnik filozofije« i zbog toga što govori o jednosti čitave stvarnosti, odnosno zato što se na ovaj način vitalistički ustanovljuje jedinstvo cjeline svega. (shrink)

The paper analyses fragmentarily preserved views of Empedocles, that, in the author’s opinion, represent the antecedents of deviations from the anthropocentric vision of the world and anticipate the majority of later attempts at scientific, philosophical, and legal modifications of the status of all living beings. Empedocles, namely, claims that all beings think, i.e., that they have understanding or consciousness. He is, moreover, portrayed as a proponent of the thesis that plants as well have both intellect and the ability to think, (...) and that they are driven by desire and have feelings, sadness and joy. According to him, the idea that the whole nature is akin not only has a vital-animal meaning but, to a certain extent, a mental meaning. Empedocles urged his disciples to abstain from consuming ensouled beings, since it is in the bodies of these beings that penalized souls reside. He believed that he himself was one of them who had been killed and eaten, and that it is by purification that prior sins in connection with food should be treated. Empedocles’ case shows that humans are living beings that err, and that they owe to animals justice based on mutual kinship. Aside from living a pure life, practicing the recommended katharmoi, and abstaining from flesh in any version, the path to the salvation of the soul leads through two additional dimensions. The first is being revealed in the important phrase of the sage from Acragas that one should fast from evil. And secondly, the wealth of divine thoughts is connected with being happy, just as those who have vague opinions about the gods are wretched. Eventually, the “Sicilian Muse” believed that if people live in a holy and just manner, they shall be blessed in this life, even more so after leaving this one, because they will achieve happiness that will not be temporarily, and be able to rest for eternity. (shrink)

Advocates of the questioning of the dominant anthropocentric perspective of the world have been increasingly strongly presenting ethical demands for a new solution of the relationship between humans and other beings, saying that adherence to the Western philo-sophical and theological traditions has caused the current environmental, and not just environmental, crisis. The attempts are being made to establish a new relationship by relativizing the differences between man and the non-human living beings, often by attributing specifically human traits and categories, such (...) as dignity, moral status and rights to non-human living beings. The author explores antecedents of the standpoints that deviate from the mainstream Western philosophy, in terms of non-anthropocentric extension of ethics, and finds them in the fragments of first physicists, which emphasize kinship of all varieties of life. Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, in this context, considered certain animals and plants as sacred, i.e. they believed that they are, in a sense, responsible for what they do and that they apart from being able to be driven by a natural desire, being able to breathe, feel, be sad and happy, also have a soul, power of discernment, awareness, the ability to think, understanding and mind. Finally, the author believes that solutions or mitigation of the mentioned crisis are not in the simple Aesopeian levelling of animals and plants "upwards", but in an adequate paideutic approach which in humans will develop an inherent ethical model of accepting non-human living beings as creatures who deserve moral and decent treatment and respect. (shrink)

U radu se analizira Aristotelovo razmatranje životinja, a u središtu autorovog istraživanja su tri pitanja: prisustvo logosa kod životinja, mogu li životinje djelovati voljno i jesu li životinje odgovorne za ono što čine. Aristotelov generalni stav je da životinje nemaju vjerovanja, mnijenja, rasuđivanja, mišljenja, razuma i uma. Proučavanjem Stagiraninovih spisa utvrđeno je, zatim, da životinje mogu djelovati voljno. Odgovor na dilemu jesu li životinje odgovorne za ono što čine ovisi o razumijevanju pojma odgovornosti kod Aristotela. Ako se odgovornost razumije kao (...) reguliranje svih onih aktivnosti koje su učinjene hotimično, tj. voljno, životinje se tada mogu smatrati odgovornima. S druge strane, ako se opseg odgovornosti ograniči na moralnu evaluaciju nečijeg djelanja, u koju je uključena aktivnost logosa, životinje će biti izuzete iz ovako razumljenog pojma odgovornosti. Autor je, na Aristotelovom tragu, zaključio da, budući da životinje mogu imati phantasiu da je ono što rade ispravno ili pogrešno, one za svoje čine trebaju biti nagrađene odnosno kažnjene.This paper analyzes Aristotle’s treatment of animals and the author’s research focuses on three issues: the presence of logos in animals, if animals can act voluntarily and if animals are responsible for what they do. Aristotle’s general standing point is that animals do not have beliefs, opinions, calculations, thoughts, thinking and reason. By studying Stagirites’ volumes it has been determined, subsequently, that animals can act voluntarily. Resolution to the dilemma whether animals are responsible for what they do depends on the understanding of the Aristotle’s concept of responsibility. If responsibility is understood as regulating all of those activities which were undertaken on purpose i.e. voluntarily, animals can be considered responsible. On the other hand, if the scope of responsibility is limited to the moral evaluation of acts, including the activity of logos, animals will be excluded from thus understood concept of responsibility. The author has, following Aristotle’s footsteps, concluded that since animals can have phantasia that what they do is right or wrong, they should be either rewarded or punished for their acts. (shrink)

The author analyses normative acts regulating the protection of animals, both at the national level (especially in the Republic of Serbia) and at the level of supranational organisations and state unions (the Council of Europe and the European Union), but also attempts to conceptualise the terms used in the documents observing the protection of animals. From the practical and philosophical perspective, this paper considers the terms (I) “animal” (“any vertebrate animal capable of experiencing pain, suffering, fear and stress”), (II) “welfare” (...) (“the provision of conditions in which animals can exercise their physiological and other species-specific needs”), (III) “abuse” (“any treatment or disregard of animals, that causes pain, suffering, fear, stress, injury, damages the genetic integrity of the animal and causes death intentionally or through negligence”), and other terms relevant to understanding the prevailing anthropocentric approach to animals. The paper also examines the difficulties in implementing the adopted legislation on the protection and welfare of animals caused by an insufficiently internalised sensitivity of official institutions as well as citizens towards so-called non-human living beings. In the author’s view, it is important that they do not fall below the achieved civilisational standards of ethical and moral culture in their cognitions and insights, and that they consider various topics related to animals with due caution and awareness of the dilemmas they may encounter in their professional work and lives. An appropriate pluriperspective approach and a consciousness of responsibility should eventually lead to a more sensitive attitude of said subjects towards the non-human part of the animal creation. (shrink)

Advocates of the questioning of the dominant anthropocentric perspective of the world have been increasingly strongly presenting ethical demands for a new solution of the relationship between humans and other beings, saying that adherence to the Western philosophical and theological traditions has caused the current environmental, and not just environmental, crisis. The attempts are being made to establish a new relationship by relativizing the differences between man and the non-human living beings, often by attributing specifically human traits and categories, such (...) as dignity, moral status and rights to non-human living beings. The author explores antecedents of the standpoints that deviate from the mainstream Western philosophy, in terms of non-anthropocentric extension of ethics, and finds them in the fragments of first physicists, which emphasize kinship of all varieties of life. Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, in this context, considered certain animals and plants as sacred, i.e. they believed that they are, in a sense, responsible for what they do and that they apart from being able to be driven by a natural desire, being able to breathe, feel, be sad and happy, also have a soul, power of discernment, awareness, the ability to think, understanding and mind. Finally, the author believes that solutions or mitigation of the mentioned crisis are not in the simple Aesopeian levelling of animals and plants "upwards", but in an adequate paideutic approach which in humans will develop an inherent ethical model of accepting non-human living beings as creatures who deserve moral and decent treatment and respect. (shrink)

Istraživanje poimanja globalizacije u mnogim je svojim elementima slojevito i difuzno, pa nije jednostavno čak ni navesti sve sfere njene aplikacije, kao ni načine manifestiranja. Multidimenzionalnost određenja globalizacije otežana je i zbog toga što ona nije nekakvo stanje, već proces, pa su teškoće njenog opojmljenja povezane sa tematskim racionalnim odnosom prema samom tom procesu. Nakon analize najpoznatijih definicija globalizacije autor je zaključio da je ona u bitnom smislu povezana sa deteritorijalizacijom i reteritorijalizacijom socio-ekonomskog, političkog i kulturnog prostora. Globalizacija, drukčije rečeno, (...) donosi sa sobom zgušnjavanje tj. kompresiju kako prostora tako i vremena, što uzrokuje rast interpersonalnih veza i veću brzinu i protočnost komunikacije među ljudima. Konačno, globalizacija je, po autoru, kompleksan, ambivalentan pa i proturječan proces, koji omogućava širenje međuzavisnosti i produbljivanje socijalnih veza između različitih faktora u gotovo svim aspektima suvremenog života.The exploring of the concepts of globalization is, in many of its elements, multilayered and diffuse and therefore it is not simple even to list all of the spheres of its application, as well as the ways in which it manifests itself. Multidimensionality of the definition is made even more difficult due to the fact that globalization is not some kind of a state, but a process, so the difficulties of its conceptualization are related to the thematic rational approach to this process. Having analyzed the most famous definitions of globalization, the author concludes that the globalization in its substantiality is related to the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of socioeconomic, political and cultural space. In other words, globalization brings about the density i.e. compression of the space as well as the time, which results in the increase of interpersonal relations and greater velocity and flowability of communication among people. Finally, according to the author, globalization is a complex, ambivalent and also a controversial process, which enables the spread of interconnectedness and deepening of social relations among different factors in almost all aspects of modern life. (shrink)

Istraživanje demonstriranja »pravde« u Homerovoj Odiseji od strane kraljeva ili sudaca u stvarnim situacijama toga doba, pokazalo je da je riječ o postupcima u partikularnoj formi, a ne o apstraktno pojmljenim principima. Ovi su postupci rješavali uvijek konkretne i specifične ad hoc situacije, a nisu primjenjivali depersonalizirane i općevažeće zakone, te se njihova uloga iscrpljivala u pregovaračkom postupku i nagodbi rivalskih strana. Namjera im je bila da nanovo uspostave destabiliziranu ustaljenost življenja običajnosne zajednice, pa se može reći da je spomenuta (...) procedura de facto predstavljala »pravdu« koja se primjenjivala u danom kontekstu. Zaključak autora jest da ovako shvaćena »pravda« nije bila ništa drugo do odgovarajuća metodologija, tj. pravilo konzerviranja postojećih običaja, ili naprosto korekcija narušenog modusa egzistiranja u nekom polisu.Research of demonstration of “justice” in Homer’s Odyssey by kings or magistrates in actu­al situations of the time, showed that these were particular procedures rather than abstractconcepts, always applied to resolve concrete and specific ad hoc situations and never to thedepersonalized and general laws, so their role was being exhausted in the course of negotiati­ons and settlement of rival parties. Their intention was to reestablish destabilized continuity ofmorality-based community, therefore it can be said that the mentioned procedure de facto repre­sented “justice” applied to a given context. The author concludes that the concept of “justice”in this sense was merely a suitable methodology, i.e. the rule of conservation of existing mores,or simply a correction of a violated mode of existence in a certain polis. (shrink)

Istraživanje demonstriranja »pravde« u Homerovoj Odiseji od strane kraljeva ili sudaca u stvarnim situacijama toga doba, pokazalo je da je riječ o postupcima u partikularnoj formi, a ne o apstraktno pojmljenim principima. Ovi su postupci rješavali uvijek konkretne i specifične ad hoc situacije, a nisu primjenjivali depersonalizirane i općevažeće zakone, te se njihova uloga iscrpljivala u pregovaračkom postupku i nagodbi rivalskih strana. Namjera im je bila da nanovo uspostave destabiliziranu ustaljenost življenja običajnosne zajednice, pa se može reći da je spomenuta (...) procedura de facto predstavljala »pravdu« koja se primjenjivala u danom kontekstu. Zaključak autora jest da ovako shvaćena »pravda« nije bila ništa drugo do odgovarajuća metodologija, tj. pravilo konzerviranja postojećih običaja, ili naprosto korekcija narušenog modusa egzistiranja u nekom polisu.Research of demonstration of “justice” in Homer’s Odyssey by kings or magistrates in actu­al situations of the time, showed that these were particular procedures rather than abstractconcepts, always applied to resolve concrete and specific ad hoc situations and never to thedepersonalized and general laws, so their role was being exhausted in the course of negotiati­ons and settlement of rival parties. Their intention was to reestablish destabilized continuity ofmorality-based community, therefore it can be said that the mentioned procedure de facto repre­sented “justice” applied to a given context. The author concludes that the concept of “justice”in this sense was merely a suitable methodology, i.e. the rule of conservation of existing mores,or simply a correction of a violated mode of existence in a certain polis. (shrink)

Autor u radu analizira predsokratovsko razmatranje φρόνησις-a i αἴσθησις-a, promatrano kroz prizmu Aristotelovog poricanja logoskih sposobnosti životinjama i biljkama. Aristotelov generalni stav je da većina predsokratovaca nije razlučivala um, mišljenje i razboritost od opažanja i drugih aspekata duše. Bitnu aporiju u promišljanju predsokratovaca Stagiranin obrazlaže tvrdnjom da su oni, doduše, istraživali istinu bića, ali polazeći od pretpostavke da su jedina zbiljska bića osjetilne stvari. Predsokratovci, sukladno tomu, shvaćaju umovanje kao nešto tjelesno poput opažanja i često razumiju da se slično sličnim (...) opaža i shvaća. Očekivana konsekvenca ovakvog pristupa tvrdnja je predsokratovaca da ne samo ljudi nego i sva ostala bića imaju svijest, mišljenje i razboritost. Do krajnosti doveden stav nekih od njih izražava se riječima da se biljke pokreću po prirodnoj žudnji, da dišu, osjećaju, da mogu biti tužne i vesele, kao i da imaju moć rasuđivanja, razum i um. Autor je zaključio da je predsokratovac Alkmeon razlikovanjem mišljenja tj. razboritosti od opažanja najjasnije anticipirao Aristotelovo vlastito stajalište. Alkmeonova tvrdnja da se čovjek razlikuje od drugih živih bića po tome što on jedini razumije, dok druga živa bića primaju osjete, ali ne razumiju, na tragu je Stagiraninovog naglašavanja da se logoske sposobnosti mogu pripisivati isključivo ljudima i da čovjek ima ontološki primat u odnosu na druga živa bića. (shrink)