Moral action, ignorance of fact, and inability

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (3):333-355 (1965)
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Abstract

I TRY TO SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO PRICHARD IN "DUTY AND\nIGNORANCE OF FACT" THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAINING\nTHAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AT LEAST WE MAY BE UNAVOIDABLY\nIGNORANT OF OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, AND OF WHAT IS\nRIGHT AND WRONG GENERALLY. WHY DID PRICHARD STAND SO FIRMLY\nAGAINST UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE OF OUR DUTY? I SUGGEST THAT\nHE IS REALLY THINKING ABOUT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR BEING\nBLAMEWORTHY, FOR CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO\nSPEAK OF SOMEONE'S BEING BLAMEWORTHY BY VIRTUE OF\nUNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE. I ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE\nCONNECTION BETWEEN MORAL ACTION AND ABILITY, AND I TRY TO\nSHOW THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID AGAINST THE USUAL VIEW\nTHAT "DUTY TO," "WRONG NOT TO," ETC., ENTAIL "ABLE TO."

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