Abstract

This paper offers a novel reading of Immanuel Kant’s mature political philosophy. It argues that Kant’s doctrine of right is best understood as dealing with the question of how to justify practices of social power. It thereby suggests that the main object of Kant’s doctrine of right should be read in terms of individuals’ higher order power of free choice and action (“Willkür”). It then argues that the main normative problem Kant discusses in the doctrine of right is the problem of domination. While Kant must allow persons the exercises of their capacities for free choice and action for reasons of freedom, the structural upshots of such exercises by a multitude of empirically interconnected persons leads to a structure of private right, which is normatively problematic. This paper suggests interpreting this problem as one of structural domination. This reading sheds new light on Kant’s institutional theory of global justice. It enables us to better understand Kant’s theory of global institutionalization, particularly with regard to the question of why national and global institutionalization are so important in Kant’s theory and with regard to the question of what type of law cosmopolitan law is.