Abstract

After a chapter on the theory of the concrete universal, Milne discusses the moral and political views of Bradley, Bosanquet, Green, and Royce. Milne's view is that the social philosophy of Idealism is permanently valuable, the metaphysics not. The work of Bradley and Bosanquet, he argues, is weakened by unnoticed ambiguities in their conception of the concrete universal; Green's work, though more consistent, involves a fundamental error in the theory of knowledge; and there is doubt as to the consistency of Royce's metaphysics with his ethics. We can develop a humanistic Idealism which will be free of the metaphysics of the Absolute and the conservative tendencies of that view, Milne says, and his expositions and criticisms of earlier views are part of his effort to do this. The theory of a scale of standards of rationality in activity, on which Milne rests his reconstruction, needs to be more clearly developed, but it is useful to have so sympathetic a discussion of this general point of view.--J. B. S.