Judgment and the identity theory of truth

Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-31

Downloads
153 (#127,588)

6 months
21 (#133,324)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Colin Johnston
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

Truth without Dependence.Robert Trueman - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):89-121.
Unity through truth.Bryan Pickel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
The identity theory of truth.Stewart Candlish - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. C. M. Colombo & Bertrand Russell - 1975 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edited by C. K. Ogden.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge, England: Allen & Unwin.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.

View all 30 references / Add more references