Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):311 – 324 (1999)
Abstract |
Mainstream theories of decision making conceptualise uncertainty in terms of a well-defined probability distribution or weighting function. Following Knight, radical Keynesians consider subjective expected utility (SEU) theory and its variants as a restricted theory of decision-making applicable to situations of risk and, hence, of limited relevance to the understanding of crucial economic decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty in which probabilities are ill-defined, possibly non-existent. The objective of this paper is to outline a radical Keynesian theory of decision-making under uncertainty, arguing that Keynes's suggestion to a two-dimensional probability-credence framework provides the basis for determining the limitations of mainstream approaches and points the way forward to the construction of a more general encompassing theory relevant to psychologists and economists outside of the Keynesian tradition.
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DOI | 10.1080/095150899105792 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1984 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Decision Making Under Great Uncertainty.Sven Ove Hansson - 1996 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (3):369-386.
Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments.Jochen Runde - 1990 - Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):275.
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