Abstract
The "purpose of this book is to examine those conceptions of metaphysics prevalent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British philosophic thought." The book traces empiricist conceptions of metaphysics from Bacon onward to Reid and Stewart. Armstrong's treatment of Bacon is the most controversial chapter in his book. Armstrong opposes the widely held view that Bacon was essentially a mechanist. Armstrong argues that the texts usually cited to show that Bacon held the mechanical philosophy are at best ambiguous; while, on the other hand, there are Bacon's clear statements on metaphysics as a science of formal causes. It is on the basis of these latter statements that Armstrong argues that Bacon's metaphysics is essentially Aristotelian. In the language of the tradition, Armstrong's interpretation of Bacon might be summed up as follows: Bacon understood metaphysics to be the science of formal causality; that is, he understood metaphysics as the science of Being as Being. Consequently, according to Armstrong, a characteristic empiricist metaphysics first appears in the thought of Hobbes. In Hobbes the mechanical philosophy is established as the science of nature, as the science of Being as Being. Metaphysics becomes defined once and for all within British Empiricism in opposition to physics or the materialist ontology. Beginning with Hobbes metaphysics is understood within British Empiricism as either epistemology or theology. This historical study should prove of interest to those who, brought up in the tradition of British Empiricism, are rediscovering the traditional questions of metaphysics.--J. W. S.