Abstract

This work is an examination of the notion of moral feeling as it is developed in Kantian ethics in the pre-critical writings, the critical writings, and in Kant's later works. He addresses the problem of how a formal principle of obligation can provide a drive to action and how material feelings can take on the character of obligation. He uses various descriptions of what he calls moral feeling in an attempt to establish the link between formal principle and moral action. ;Moral feeling is described by Kant as inner law, universal affection for mankind, a felt dependence of the private will on the universal will, reverence for the law, a felt need to act on what one knows to be one's duty, and finally, a susceptibility to be moved by practical reason. ;In the context of the formulations of the Categorical Imperative, there are ends described which are also duties. My thesis is that when these ends are properly understood and adopted by a moral agent, the motivation to pursue them is provided by way of moral feeling as a response to the law. Also, I have suggested that there is a hierarchy of subjective principles of action, or maxims, which is motivated by moral feeling. I think that the notion of such a hierarchy sheds some light on certain issues which have historically been considered to be problems in Kantian ethics. ;The notions of principle as law and as maxim are discussed, as well as some of the problems which arise from vagueness and ambiguity in the use of language, both in the English translations and in the German texts.