Rationality in Anthropological Explanation

In Nathalie Bulle & Francesco Di Iorio (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism: Volume I. Springer Verlag. pp. 203-225 (2023)
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Abstract

Jarvie links the search for rational explanation in anthropology to methodological individualism (MI) through the controversy around anthropological functionalism. The latter was a revolutionary new approach with roots in the sociology of Durkheim. Did it presuppose a group mind, teleological direction, or some other irreducible causal entity that contradicts the principles of MI? Jarvie had argued that it did and so must be used with caution. In this chapter he argues functionalism gives an irreducible role to institutions and that MI merely smuggles them in as part of the agent’s situation. MI’s reductionist program must therefore be used with caution, not taken literally. Case studies of cargo cults and of the panics around the COVID-19 pandemic are used to show how rational explanation proceeds and the extent to which it is compatible (or not) with MI.

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