Abstract
It is argued that methodological individualism entails a holism of the parts, as originally proposed by Jan Smuts (1926/1927), where (1) the properties of entities involved in explanation are inherent to their participation in the whole they constitute, and (2) the whole does not act as a separate cause, distinct from its parts. This holism of parts involves a non-positivist and non-reductionist epistemology that is consistent with the analytical decomposition of wholes into basic units as advocated by methodological individualism (MI) for the social sciences. According to MI, social actors are the basic units of analysis, and their rational capacity (understood in a broad sense as a general—trans-situational—capacity of understanding) is an explanatory principle inherent in their social being. The epistemological and ontological incompatibilities between methodological individualism's holism of the parts and mainstream reductionist or non-reductionist physicalist approaches, as well as emergentist approaches of critical realism, may explain the misunderstanding of methodological individualism within Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy.