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Split‐Case Arguments about Personal Identity
In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 86–87 (2011-09-16)
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split‐case arguments about personal identity empiricist tradition, for diachronic identity of a person formal properties of the identity relation Derek Parfit, to discard concept of personal identity altogether “split cases,” for two or more candidates, fulfilling requirements Richard Swinburne (#24), arguing for dualism discarding concept of personal identity, for nonsymmetric successor relation
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