Paying attention to unconscious mental states: an examination of the case of the inattentive driver

Abstract

People often engage in simultaneous activities. For example, a person might be driving to the workplace, while conversing with a passenger in the vehicle. Such persons often report feeling as if the driving is being done on "automatic pilot" and have difficulty remembering features specific to the drive. How exactly to classify this case, which will be referred to as the "inattentive driver", is a source of some controversy. Some may be tempted not to count it as an experience at all. Others claim that the driving is properly identified as an experience, but disagree as to what kind of experience it is (e.g., conscious or unconscious). In this thesis, these competing views will be assessed and it will be argued that the case of the inattentive driver should, in fact, be classified as an experience. Ultimately, it will be shown that those who view inattentive driving as a conscious or unconscious experience, have more in common than it might seem

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