Dummett on Truth-Conditions, Frege’s Analysis of Sentence Meaning, and the Slingshot Argument

In Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Truth, Meaning, Justification, and Reality: Themes From Dummett. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 81-102 (2017)
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10.1515/9783110459135-006

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