Extensional and non-truth-functional contexts

Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164 (1969)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.

Similar books and articles

Indirect Discourse, Relativism, and Contexts That Point to Other Contexts.Christopher Gauker - 2010 - In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-dependence, Perspective and Relativity in Language and Thought. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 6--283.
Note on the scope of truth-functional logic.David Sherry - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328.
Three dogmas of 'if'.Rani Lill Anjum - 2008 - In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.
Functional role and truth conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):157-181.
Conditionals and Actuality.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):135 - 150.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
430 (#43,978)

6 months
62 (#69,841)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Three types of referential opacity.Richard Sharvy - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (2):153-161.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references