Belief-attribution and rationality: a dilemma for Jerry Fodor

In Daniel Andler (ed.), Facets of rationality. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. pp. 19--34 (1995)
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Abstract

Jerry Fodor argued for an account of belief attribution very close to the theory of direct reference. I argue that his account conflicts with constraints on psychological explanation which he ought to accept.

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Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

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