On Saving the Astronomical Phenomena: Physical Realism in Struggle with Mathematical Realism in Francis Bacon, al-Bitruji, and Averroës

Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (1):135-151 (2019)
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Abstract

When we examine the history of astronomy up to the end of the seventeenth century by considering the relation between mathematical astronomy and natural philosophy, it has been argued that there were two groups of philosophers and astronomers: instrumentalists and realists. However, this classification is deficient when we consider attitudes toward the explanatory power of mathematics in determining astronomical theories. I offer the solution of dividing realists into two subcategories—mathematical realists and physical realists. Mathematical realists include those who thought mathematics could provide the real motions of celestial bodies. The physical realists, who include Ibn Rushd (Averroës), believed mathematics could not provide us with the real structure of the heavens. To avoid contradictions between the physical and mathematical models, the physical realists held that a mathematical model of the heavens should be designed by considering physics. I argue, in this article, that Francis Bacon can be considered a physical realist.

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Unsal Cimen
University of Otago

References found in this work

Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Duhem & Philip P. Wiener - 1955 - Science and Society 19 (1):85-87.
To save the Phenomena.Pierre Duhem, Edmund Doland & Chaninah Maschler - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):303-304.
Francis Bacon and the Classification of Natural History.Peter Anstey - 2012 - Early Science and Medicine 17 (1):11-31.

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