Why higher-order vagueness is a pseudo-problem

Mind 103 (409):35-41 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many writers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness". Almost as many have found it to be a problem that needs to be addressed. In what follows I shall argue that, whilst we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. The crucial point is the vagueness of "vague", which shows the phenomenon to be unproblematic though real enough.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
369 (#52,244)

6 months
8 (#342,364)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Supervaluationism and Its Logics.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):633-676.
Indeterminate truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
The impossibility of vagueness.Kit Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Characterizing vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references