Two kinds of organic unity

The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):299-320 (1998)
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Abstract

This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore''s principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore''s own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has been defended by Korsgaard, says that parts can change their values when they enter wholes, so no additional value is needed. The paper shows that the two interpretations, which differ on such apparently important issues as the nature of intrinsic value, can always yield the same conclusions about the overall value in a state of affairs, so there is in that sense nothing to choose between them. At the same time, though, the differences between the interpretations make sometimes one and sometimes the other more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view. In this last connection the paper considers views about beauty, posthumous achievement, vices of disproportion, deserved and compassionate pain, and undeserved and malicious pleasure.

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Thomas Hurka
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.

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References found in this work

Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford University Press.
Me and My Life.Shelly Kagan - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:309-324.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.

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