Abstract

In this dissertation, I seek to formulate a moral and constitutional defense of the right to abortion that takes both life and liberty seriously. In order to do so, I follow the basic approach central to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade by focusing my inquiry upon the following question: Does the fetus's potential provide a compelling justification for the governmental denial of a woman's procreative autonomy when her exercise of that freedom requires the abortion of a fetus? I agree with the Supreme Court's conclusion that women have a right to abortion until late in pregnancy because the fetus's potential does not provide a compelling reason for the total prohibition of abortion. My goal is to offer what is missing from Roe by formulating an extended philosophical defense of this position. ;In Chapter One, I contend that women have a right to procreative autonomy, by which I mean that the government may not justly deprive them of individual control over their most basic procreative choices absent a compelling justification for such intervention. I further contend that the moral significance of the fetus's potential for human life in the full sense may in fact provide a compelling reason for the denial of procreative autonomy in the unique circumstances of pregnancy. In Chapter Two, I defend the legitimacy of unenumerated constitutional rights. In Chapter Three, I confront and reject preclusive defenses of the right to abortion that are rooted in the Establishment Clause or in certain accounts of philosophical disagreement. In Chapter Four, I offer an argument for the conclusion that women have a right to abortion until late in pregnancy because there is no compelling justification for a comprehensive prohibition of abortion. I do so by formulating a thought experiment aimed at demonstrating that respect for fetal potential does not take clear moral priority over respect for women's procreative liberty until late in pregnancy