Thomson, the right to life, and partial birth abortion or two MULES for Sister Sarah

Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2):99-101 (2002)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Thomson's famous attempt to reconcile the fetus's putative right to life with robust abortion rights is not tenable. Given her view, whether or not an abortion violates the fetus's right to life depends on the abortion procedure utilised. And I argue that Thomson's view implies that any late term abortion that involves feticide is impermissible. In particular, this would rule out the partial birth abortion technique which has been so controversial of late

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Peter Alward
University of Saskatchewan

Citations of this work

A new defense of Quinn's principle of double effect.Ian A. Smith - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (2):349–364.

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References found in this work

A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.

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