A General Theory of Representation

Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley (2003)
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Abstract

This dissertation establishes the ontology of representation. The account stipulates necessary features for an object to have the status of "representation." There are three requirements for an object to have representation status: the phenomenon in question must cause the biological capacity for three dimensional perception into two dimensional surfaces---"3/2 vision" , the phenomenon must cause the perception of a frame , and the phenomenon must cause the recognition that it has features not intrinsic to its physics. These three requirements are features of a representation which stand in a causal relationship to specific biological capacities of perception. As such, representation as an object depends on mental-physical features for its perception and also for its production. This establishes the ontology of representation as mind-dependent

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Motor intentionality and its primordiality.Jennifer Hudin - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):573 – 590.

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