Abstract

This dissertation is an exegesis of Bergson's treatment of the idea of endosmosis. For Bergson, endosmosis is a process in which a correspondence is set up between the external world and consciousness. This process enables concepts employed for understanding the external world to be imposed, via mental habits, onto our ways for understanding self and life. Ultimately this dissertation supports the view that endosmosis is a feature of Bergson's method for criticizing some concepts pertaining to theory of knowledge and metaphysics. Emphasis is placed on Bergson's belief that the task of philosophy is to disentangle interpretive elements from the data of immediate experience. ;Chapter One explicates Bergson's account of endosmosis. Chapter Two discusses the major terms in Bergson's theory of knowledge--analysis, intuition, perception and empiricism--and demonstrates that endosmosis confuses the roles of these terms. Chapter Three examines duration, space, and time; endosmosis is shown to contribute to the concept of homogeneous time by producing a mixture from the imposition of the idea of pure space onto the consciousness of duration. Chapter Four examines Bergson's realism, matter, life, self, and causality and freedom; endosmosis is treated specifically with reference to each of these terms. ;The final chapter summarizes the account of endosmosis by sitting that a general endosmosis is prevalent, for Bergson, by the intrusion of practical interests into the domain of speculative interests. In addition, an evaluation of some of the terms is given. Finally, an interpretation of Bergson's metaphysics is offered which defends ontological idealism against vitalism and a metaphysics of pure process. According to our interpretation reality is one substance, but composed of heterogeneous strata in which mind is common to all of them. Endosmosis occurs when a stratum of reality is misrepresented through the illegitimate application of concepts that were modeled from other strata