The Essence of Expressivism

Analysis 54 (1):19 - 20 (1994)
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Abstract

It is argued, in light of the deflationist conception of truth, that expressivism (emotivism, non-cognitivism) about ethical pronouncements should be formulated merely as the thesis that such pronouncements are expressions of desire, and should not incorporate the further thesis (traditionally associated with expressivism) that they have no truth value.

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Paul Horwich
New York University

Citations of this work

Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
Negation, expressivism, and intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.

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