John Locke's Rhetoric: Response to the Nominal Quandaries of Legitimate Communities

Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (1):33 - 50 (1996)
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Abstract

Using rhetorical analysis as a bridge, the essay attempts to reconcile the scientific Locke with Locke the social philosopher of rights who worked a persuasion against the fruits of social passivity and the status quo; the latter are represented by ingrained institutions like legal nonage and monarchy. The consistency between the two Lockes is language as it forwards understanding in a legitimating consensus. Ironically, iteration and nominalisms bind Locke's social contract; yet the linguistic reduction inherent in nominalisms precludes the production of a more complex public knowledge that might improve community problem solving

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