The analytics of continuing conflict

Synthese 76 (2):201-233 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Individuals, groups, or nations — if rational and self-interested — will be balancing on the margin between two alternative ways of generating income: peaceful production and exchange, versus appropriative efforts designed to seize resources previously controlled by others. Both production and appropriation, on the assumption here, are entirely normal lines of activity engaged in to the extent that doing so seems profitable.The general-equilibrium steady-state model involves a resource partition function, a social production function, a combat power function, and an income distribution equation. Solutions were obtained under thesymmetrical Cournot protocol and two alternativeasymmetrical assumptions: the familiar Stackelberg condition and a more novel hierarchical protocol called Threat-and-Promise. The analysis demonstrates that, in contrast with the harmonistic bias of orthodox economic theory, a general-equilibrium model can also encompass the hostile and destructive interactions that characterize real-world social relations

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,438

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
78 (#210,717)

6 months
9 (#295,942)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?