The freedom of collective agents

Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Corporate freedom is the freedom of a collective agent to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account, a collective or corporate agent is free exactly if the individuals who constitute the corporate agent are free. It is argued that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for corporate freedom. The alternative account proposed here focuses on the performance of the joint action by the corporate agent itself. Subsequently, the analysis is applied to Cohen’s (1983) analysis of proletarian freedom. Cohen claims that proletarians are individually free but collectively unfree to leave the proletariat. I argue that, pace Cohen, such a contrast between individual and collective freedom can only exist if collective freedom is interpreted in terms of corporate freedom

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,528

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
126 (#130,791)

6 months
15 (#109,835)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Frank Hindriks
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Collective Responsibility for Oppression.Titus Stahl - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (3):473-501.
Does collective unfreedom matter? Individualism, power and proletarian unfreedom.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2023 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (6):964-985.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

An essay on rights.Hillel Steiner - 1994 - Oxford, UK ;: Blackwell.
On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.

View all 29 references / Add more references