On Block's delineation of the border between seeing and thinking

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This note is concerned with Ned Block's claim that cognition differs from perception in being paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and non-iconic. As against Block, it maintains that large stretches of cognition constitutively involve, or depend on, iconic representations.

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2024-04-03

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Christopher Hill
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

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References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Between Perception and Thought.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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