Abstract

In the recent past, excluded-opposite arguments were commonly used by ordinary language philosophers. Even the most recent literature of the last decade contains instances of their employment. What is established in the dissertation is that EOA's occur in two distinct forms: For certain universal generalizations to be meaningful the denial or "opposite" of its predicate must have an application to an existing instance of the class of things denoted by the subject. For example, Ryle's argument against the statement 'All coins are counterfeit' is of this form. There must be a genuine coin for it to be possible and thus meaningful to say that a coin is counterfeit. The analogous argument is that there must be a veridical experience for it to make sense to say that there is an experience that is not veridical. For universal generalizations to be meaningful or non-trivial, the denial or "opposite" of its predicate must have an application to at least a conceivable instance of the subject. For example, Malcolm argues that 'No empirical statement is certain' is trivial unless it is at least possible for an empirical statement to be certain. The first form is called the strong form of EOA. The second is called the weak form. ;It is shown that the critics of EOA's, C. K. Grant and John Passmore in particular, have confused these two forms and, as a result, have failed to provide an adequate analysis. Their criticisms are primarily directed toward the strong form. In only one instance is the weak form recognized, but in that case Passmore's criticism is found to be invalid. ;Finally, defenses of EOA's provided by Alice Ambrose and David Favrholdt are found to be deficient. Favrholdt fails to account for the weak form in the conditions he sets down for EOA's, and the example of an EOA he gives is invalid. Ambrose does give an account of the weak form, but her defense of EOA's used against general metaphysical claims rests on a questionable assumption that because the metaphysician refuses to accept empirical evidence against his claim, the claim must be logically necessary and thus trivial in the metaphysician's special language. In conclusion, it is argued that the weak form of EOA can only be applied to non-theoretical claims and then only if it is shown clearly that the truth of the claim is guaranteed solely on the basis of the definitions of the terms in question