9 found
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George Bowles [10]George Mcmillan Bowles [1]
  1.  26
    Propositional Relevance.George Bowles - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (2).
  2.  42
    Favorable Relevance and Arguments.George Bowles - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (1).
  3.  21
    The Probabilistic Import of Illatives.George Bowles & Thomas E. Gilbert - 1993 - Argumentation 7 (3):247-262.
    It is not only overtly probabilistic illatives like ‘makes it certain that’ but also apparently non-probabilistic ones like ‘therefore’ that have probabilistic import. Illatives like ‘therefore’ convey the meaning that the premise confers on the conclusion a probability not only greater than 0 but also greater than 1/2. But because they do not say whether that probability is equal to or less than 1, these illatives are appropriately called ‘neutral’.
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  4.  23
    Evaluating Arguments: The Premise-Conclusion Relation.George Bowles - 1991 - Informal Logic 13 (1).
  5.  25
    The Deductive/Inductive Distinction.George Bowles - 1994 - Informal Logic 16 (3):159-184.
    In this paper I examine five distinctions between deductive and inductive arguments, concluding that the best of the five defines a deductive argument as one in which conclusive favorable relevance to its conclusion is attributed to its premises, and an inductive argument as any argument that is not deductive. This distinction, unlike its rivals, is both exclusive and exhaustive; permits both good and bad arguments of each kind; and is both useful and needed in evaluating at least some arguments.
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  6.  30
    Rely to Professor Allen.George Bowles - 1996 - Informal Logic 18 (1).
    I reply to three criticisms of my "Propositional Relevance" offered by Derek Allen, First, Professor Allen points out an inconsistency between my theory of relevance and my reply to an objection, I admit the error but add that it is remediable. Second, he argues that my theory of relevance is counterintuitive. I argue that it is not. And finally, he says that where I use phrases like 'p makes q certain,' I should instead use phrases like 'p, if true, makes (...)
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  7.  21
    Professor Fisher on Suppositions.George Bowles - 1993 - Argumentation 7 (3):237-246.
    I first support Alec Fisher's thesis that premises and conclusions in arguments can be unasserted first by arguing in its favor that only it preserves our intuition that it is at least possible that two arguments share the same premises and the same conclusion although not everything that is asserted in the one is also asserted in the other and second by answering two objections that might be raised against it. I then draw from Professor Fisher's thesis the consequence that (...)
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  8.  16
    The Asymmetry Thesis and the Diversity of "Invalid" Argument-Forms.George Bowles - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1).
    According to the Asymmetry Thesis, whereas there are many kinds of argument-forms that make at least some of their instances valid, there is none that makes any of its instances invalid. To refute this thesis, a counterexample has been produced in the form of an argument-form whose premise-form's instances are all logically true and whose conclusion form's instances are all logically false. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are many more kinds of argument-forms that make some (...)
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  9.  28
    Affirming the Consequent.George Bowles - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):429-444.
    The thesis of this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its premises at all favorably relevant to its conclusion. In support of this thesis I assume two premises and argue for a third. My two assumptions are these: (1) that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion certain relative to its premises (this is widely, if not universally, acknowledged by writers (...)
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