Knowledge‐That as Knowledge‐How

In How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 26–75 (2011)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: The Rylean Distinction The Rylean Argument Wittgenstein on Rule‐following The Knowledge‐as‐Ability Hypothesis Justification Grades of Knowledge Denying Knowledge‐Absolutism: Clear Precedents Denying Knowledge‐Absolutism: Possibly only Apparent Precedents Sceptical Challenges Sceptical Limitations Epistemic Agents Abilities Rylean Mistakes Conclusion.

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Reprint years

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9781118083178   9780470658123

DOI

10.1002/9781118083178.ch2

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

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