Technological Knowledge-That As Knowledge-How: a Comment

Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):567-572 (2015)
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Abstract

Norström has argued that contemporary epistemological debates about the conceptual relations between knowledge-that and knowledge-how need to be supplemented by a concept of technological knowledge—with this being a further kind of knowledge. But this paper argues that Norström has not shown why technological knowledge-that is so distinctive because Norström has not shown that such knowledge cannot be reduced conceptually to a form of knowledge-how. The paper thus applies practicalism to the case of technological knowledge-that. Indeed, the paper shows why Norström’s conception of technological knowledge unintentionally strengthens this proposed form of reduction

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

Citations of this work

Knowledge as Potential for Action.Stephen Hetherington - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2).

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